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Abstract
We analyze when and why trials can emerge in equilibrium when a defendant may se-
quentially face multiple plaintiffs. Subsequent potential plaintiffs learn about their chances of
winning from the initial trial outcome. A trial in the initial case is like an experiment that the
defendant can run that would induce plaintiffs’ learning. We show that the initial case can go
to trial in equilibrium when a favorable trial outcome for the defense can deter potential future
plaintiffs from filing lawsuits. The possibility of meritless lawsuits further raises the attraction
of trials. We also show that when the initial plaintiff’s attorney may represent future clients,
trials are more likely both because the attorney gains from learning, and because his ability to
attract future clients may depend on how much his initial client receives.
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1 Introduction
When and why do litigating parties go to trial? Given the high costs associated with trials, it would
seem to be in the mutual interest of a plaintiff and defendant to reach a settlement that obviates the
need for a trial that seems to destroy so much surplus. Researchers have offered many explanations
for why the litigating parties fail to settle and go to trial despite the large potential cost savings,
including prediction mistakes, asymmetric information and multiple-litigant externalities.1
In this paper we analyze when and why trials can emerge in equilibrium in a setting where
a defendant may sequentially face multiple plaintiffs. Such sequential litigation arises in many
scenarios, including product liability, personal injury, environmental pollution and so on, where
multiple plaintiffs may have been injured by the same defendant, and they become aware of the
damage, or become capable of filing lawsuits, at different points in time.2
Sequential litigation has several distinctive features that are important to integrate and un-
derstand. First, if an initial case goes to trial, future potential litigating parties will use the
trial outcome—whether the defendant wins or loses, and possibly how much the initial plaintiff
receives—to update about the likely outcomes if their cases go to trial. That is, there is plaintiff
learning. They can learn because the trial outcomes of the initial lawsuit and subsequent ones are
positively correlated, and trials convey more information than do settlements. This positive corre-
lation emerges naturally in sequential litigation for many reasons—courts may follow precedents
established in the initial trial, and potential plaintiffs may learn about a defendant’s culpability or
vulnerability, or about which legal strategies work.
The defendant understands how plaintiff’s learning makes outcomes in the initial case affect
the future costs and settlement amounts in subsequent possible lawsuits. When deciding whether
to settle or go to trial, a defendant internalizes the effects of a trial on (a) future decisions by possi-
ble plaintiffs to file lawsuits, (b) future settlement outcomes, and (c) future trial outcomes. Going
to trial represents a gamble not only over current payouts, but also over the future numbers of
plaintiffs, levels of future settlements and future legal costs—and the question becomes when does
a defendant have an incentive to take this complex trial gamble rather than settle?
In sequential litigation, one must also distinguish between pre-trial costs and trial costs. Trial
costs can be avoided by settling a case, while pre-trial costs must be incurred even prior to any set-
tlement. In practice, most litigation expenses involve discovery and experts, and are incurred prior
1We will review the literature in detail later in the introduction.
2See e.g., Rosenberg (2002) or Che and Yi (1993) for examples of sequential lawsuits.
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to a trial.3 For example, most of an expert’s time is devoted to his or her review of case materials,
report preparation and pre-trial deposition. These discovery and expert costs far outweigh the trial
costs that can be avoided by a settlement. When there is only a single plaintiff—in a “one-off” case
that has no bearing on other cases—pre-trial costs are, in effect, sunk costs that have no impact on
strategic decisions, and hence can be ignored by a researcher since only potential trial costs enter
settlements. This ceases to be true in sequential litigation. Now, the potential pre-trial costs of
future litigation enter a defendant’s decision-making, and hence the attraction of settling the first
case or taking it to trial.
In sequential litigation, one should also account for the prospective impact of meritless cases,
i.e., of cases that have a surface appearance of those with merit, but whose lack of merit would be
revealed at trial. Initial trial outcomes serve to spread beliefs about the prospects of serious cases in
the future, and this feeds back to affect how many meritless cases a defendant may have to confront.
Further, in sequential litigation, not only may a defendant care about the future ramifications of
the initial trial outcome, but so may the plaintiff’s attorney. In particular, while the initial plaintiff
does not care about future cases, his attorney might. First, information revealed by an initial trial
outcome may help the plaintiff’s attorney make more informed decisions about whether to file on
behalf of future clients. Second, it is often difficult for potential future plaintiffs to assess whether
a particular lawyer will do a good or bad job for his clients. As a result, potential plaintiffs may
rely on the payment received by the initial plaintiff to assess the quality of his attorney. If the initial
plaintiff’s lawyer extracts a larger settlement, or wins a greater payment at trial, then he or she may
attract more future clients. Advertisements by lawyers highlighting the size of settlements and trial
awards won by their clients indicate that potential plaintiffs weigh them heavily in their choices of
legal representation. This third-party audience composed of potential future clients can raise the
settlement required to induce an initial plaintiff’s lawyer to forgo a trial.
We build a simple two-period model of sequential litigation to get at these issues. The first
period corresponds to the first date at which a plaintiff realizes that he has a case against the de-
fendant that has sufficient merit to make filing a lawsuit worthwhile (i.e., the expected payment to
the plaintiff covers any pre-trial and trial costs that might be incurred). There is no asymmetric
information between the defendant and the plaintiff: they share the same prior belief about their
prospects. The second period telescopes into a single period all future cases whose trial outcomes
may be correlated with that of the initial case. To make the analysis transparent, we assume that
the payment the defendant must make to a plaintiff who wins at trial is known: the sole source of
3Final Colorado Civil Access Pilot Project Overview 8-31-11, Website of the Colorado Supreme Court.
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uncertainty concerns whether a plaintiff would win a trial. To highlight how learning by potential
future plaintiffs can lead to trials, we first assume away both meritless lawsuits and any stake the
initial plaintiff’s attorney has in future cases. That is, we consider incentives to go to trial that
devolve solely from the positive correlation in trial outcomes, so that potential plaintiffs update
positively about their chances if the defendant loses the initial trial, but update negatively if the
defendant wins. To ease presentation, we initially assume that the defendant has all bargaining
power: the defendant can make take-it-or-leave-it offers to plaintiffs.
We identify conditions under which such learning leads to trials. We first prove that once learn-
ing has occurred (i.e., after the initial lawsuit), then all cases are settled in order to avoid trial costs
and thereby maximize the surplus that a plaintiff and defendant divide. We then prove that for the
initial lawsuit to go to trial, (a) an initial win by the defense must cause future potential plaintiffs
to update sufficiently negatively about their prospects that they do not file lawsuits, (b) an initial
settlement, which does not alter beliefs of future plaintiffs, must not deter future potential plain-
tiffs, and (c) the savings from deterring future lawsuits for the defendant must exceed the combined
initial trial costs of the plaintiff and defendant. These conditions highlight how the central features
of sequential litigation lead to trials: condition (a) is easier to satisfy when future outcomes are
more closely tied to the outcome of the initial trial—with a stronger desire of a court to follow
precedents or a greater similarity among plaintiffs, there is a greater reduction in the winning prob-
ability a plaintiff expects in a future trial following an initial win by the defense; and condition
(c) becomes easy to satisfy when there are many possible future cases, so that the savings from
deterring future lawsuits are larger for the defendant.
We then observe that while the conditions under which a trial occurs are quite plausible, they
are also demanding. In particular, the payment to a winning plaintiff cannot be so high that even
a plaintiff-loss in the initial trial fails to deter subsequent plaintiffs from filing lawsuits; but the
payment to a winning plaintiff cannot be so low that an initial settlement would deter subsequent
plaintiffs from filing. Of course, the fact that it was worthwhile for the initial plaintiff to file sug-
gests that the expected payment is high enough, as subsequent plaintiffs likely face lower costs.
Finally, even if these two conditions are satisfied, it still might not be in the interest of the defendant
to take the first case trial—the gains from possibly deterring future lawsuits must exceed the initial
trial costs. In particular, there must be substantial savings in pre-trial costs associated with future
litigation for the initial trial even to be able to reduce the expected payout in future litigation: other-
wise, a Jensen’s Inequality type of argument implies that giving future plaintiffs more information
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to self-select on entering or not raises expected future settlement payments, hurting the defendant.4
We next introduce the possibility of meritless lawsuits—cases that have no chance of winning
in a trial, but, due to their similar appearances to legitimate cases, may be settled by a defendant.
We identify two ways in which the possibility of future meritless cases increases the circumstances
under which a defendant takes the initial case to trial. First, a trial that deters future plaintiffs with
serious cases also deters plaintiffs with meritless cases. Second, even when a trial does not deter
future serious cases from being filed, it can still reduce the expected payout in future meritless
cases: information revealed by the initial trial helps the defendant because her expected payout to
meritless cases is a concave function of the probability that a future plaintiff with a serious case will
win. Most clearly, with a large pool of possible future meritless cases, to deter meritless lawsuits,
a defendant adopts a mixed strategy of sometimes going to trial in the future, and, to preserve the
defendant’s indifference, fewer meritless cases must be filed when legitimate cases are stronger.
The conditions under which the initial case goes to trial, when motivated by the desire to deter
future plaintiffs, are qualitatively the same regardless of whether legal decisions are made by the
plaintiff, or by his attorney, or when a plaintiff has greater bargaining power and can extract a
greater settlement. We then consider how outcomes are affected if the initial plaintiff’s attorney
also has a stake in future trials because she may represent future plaintiffs. We show that this in-
creases the circumstances under which the initial case goes to trial: the plaintiff’s attorney prefers
a trial because it provides information that allows him to fine tune future entry decisions.
In each of the scenarios above, for the initial case to go to trial, it is crucial that likely trial
outcomes be positively correlated—trials are driven by learning about the chances that a plaintiff
will win a trial. We then assume away this correlation to show how another form of intertemporal
linkage can lead the initial case to go to trial. In particular, future potential plaintiffs may rely on
the payment received by the initial plaintiff to assess his attorney’s ability, and hence whether to
hire him. Thus, future plaintiffs are more likely to use the initial plaintiff’s lawyer if he extracts a
larger settlement, or wins a greater payment at trial. While a defendant does not care about which
attorneys represent future plaintiffs, the initial plaintiff’s lawyer does, and this can raise the amount
a defendant must pay to settle. The defendant and plaintiff’s lawyer may decide to take the initial
case to trial because the increased surplus that they extract at the expense of potential rival plaintiff
lawyers may more than cover the initial case’s trial costs. We characterize the conditions under
which the initial litigation goes to trial. In particular, the initial trial stakes cannot be so high that
the correspondingly larger settlement offer allows the initial plaintiff’s attorney to attract (enough)
4If a plaintiff has enough bargaining power, trials can emerge even when his pre-trial costs are zero.
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future clients; and the value of future clients that can be gained through a plaintiff-win must be
large enough to cover the trial costs.
The Literature. Researchers have identified other reasons for why litigating parties can fail to
settle.5 For example, trials can result when the litigating parties have different priors and some
are overly-optimistic (Gross and Syverud 1991, Hay and Spier 1998, Daughety 2000, or Daughety
and Reinganum 2005). This source of trials is absent in our model because the litigating parties
share a common prior about the likelihood of a defendant-win. Trials can also emerge if one lit-
igating party has private information (Reinganum and Wilde 1986 build a signaling model where
the informed party makes a settlement offer; Bebchuk 1986 and Spier 1992 build screening models
where the informed party receives a settlement offer). Several papers explore trial/settlement incen-
tives in sequential litigation with multiple plaintiffs when one party is privately informed. Briggs
et al. (1996) considers a privately-informed defendant, showing that the existence of subsequent
cases increases a guilty defendant’s incentive to pool with non-guilty types. This causes the initial
plaintiff to reject settlement offers more often, so more cases go to trial. In Che and Yi (1993),
cases are connected by the court’s practice of following precedent. In their model, a defendant
makes screening offers to privately-informed plaintiffs and the defendant has an incentive to set a
precedent via trial. Yang (1996) considers privately-informed plaintiffs, where with correlation in
plaintiff type, an uninformed defendant may want to learn about future plaintiffs via an initial trial.
In contrast to this literature, in most of our analysis, the defendant and plaintiffs share the same
information—our focus is on identifying the conditions under which a defendant wants to exper-
iment by going to trial in order to induce common learning by all parties. When we introduce
meritless cases, future plaintiffs have private information about whether their cases have merit;
here, we show that when the initial plaintiff and defendant are symmetrically informed, this further
enhances a defendant’s incentives to induce common learning by taking the first case to trial.
Papers showing how externalities between multiple litigating parties on the same side of the
bargaining can lead to trials include Kornhauser and Revesz (1994a, b), who consider two defen-
dants facing one plaintiff, where the defendants share liabilities due to joint and several liability,
and Spier (2002), who considers two plaintiffs facing one defendant, where a defendant-loss may
result in bankruptcy. Meurer (1992) and Sykes (1994) show how liability insurance can lead to
trials; and Spier and Sykes (1998) show how a corporate defendant’s debt can do so. All of these
sources for trials are absent in our model.
Cases may also be connected in ways other than a positive correlation in trial outcomes. Daugh-
5See Hay and Spier (1998), Daughety (2000), or Daughety and Reinganum (2005) for detailed reviews.
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ety and Reinganum (1999) and Daughety and Reinganum (2002) study settlement incentives in se-
quential litigation when a plaintiff can specify whether a settlement is confidential and a defendant
has private information about the probability of winning. They show that a defendant and an earlier
plaintiff have incentives to make their litigation confidential in order to reduce awareness of the
injury by future plaintiffs. Daughety and Reinganum (2011) investigate the connections that form
when later plaintiffs can join the initial plaintiff to reduce their trial costs, showing that a defendant
may want to preempt later entry by settling with the initial plaintiff.6 Cases may also be con-
nected by a “Most-Favored-Nation” clause, which entitles plaintiffs who settle early to retroactive
increases in their settlements should the defendant settle with subsequent plaintiffs at better terms
(Spier 2003a, 2003b, and Daughety and Reinganum 2004). Hua and Spier (2005) study a sin-
gle plaintiff who might face multiple defendants, exploring how future defendants can learn from
earlier litigation and exercise precaution outside of litigation when dealing with the same plaintiff.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our base model and analyzes several
variations, exploring when a defendant can gain from trial due to the learning by subsequent po-
tential plaintiffs about the likelihood of success. Section 3 introduces meritless cases. Section 4
establishes the robustness of our findings to alternative settlement bargaining protocols. Section 5
concludes. All proofs are in an appendix.
2 Base Model
Our two-date model features a single defendantD who faces a sequence of potential plaintiffs who
may have been damaged by D. All parties—defendant, plaintiffs and lawyers—are risk neutral,
and there is no discounting. Date 1 of our model corresponds to the moment at which the first
plaintiff, P1, realizes that he has been injured, and that the expected reward from a lawsuit may
be sufficient to compensate for the costs of pursuing the lawsuit. We collapse the arrival of all
subsequent potential plaintiffs, whose trial outcomes or settlements may hinge on the outcome of
the initial case, into date 2. Specifically, at date 2, independently of date-1 litigation outcomes, N2
potential plaintiffs realize that they also have been injured.7 Our primary focus is on a defendant’s
interaction with the very first plaintiff, and our qualitative findings would not change if the further
litigations arrive sequentially, although the analysis becomes more tedious. We describe future
6Che and Spier (2007) show how such economies of scale create negative externalities between multiple plaintiffs,
which allows a defendant to use a divide-and-conquer strategy to settle with the plaintiffs for less. Trials do not
happen due to symmetric information.
7In contrast, Daughety and Reinganum (2002) investigate the role of a trial to create awareness, where an injured
party’s probability of realizing that he is injured depends on the previous litigation outcomes.
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plaintiffs as “potential” because each injured party may choose not to bring a lawsuit against D, if
the costs outweigh the expected benefits. We refer to the defendant as “she” and each plaintiff as
“he”, and use P2 to describe a representative date-2 plaintiff.
As in Spier (2002), we build all relevant uncertainty into the probability that a plaintiff wins.
Thus, trial outcomes are binary, either a plaintiff-win or a defendant-win. A date-t plaintiff who
wins at trial receives mt > 0, where we allow the possibility that m1 6= m2. The probability that
any given plaintiff wins at trial is pi ∈ [0, 1]. However, trial outcomes are positively correlated, with
correlation coefficient ρ ∈ (0, 1). Consequently, if the initial case goes to trial, the verdict provides
subsequent plaintiffs information about their chances. Following a date-1 plaintiff-win, a date-2
plaintiff updates to believe that he will win with probability pi = pi + ρ(1 − pi); and following a
date-1 plaintiff-loss, a date-2 plaintiff updates negatively to believe that he will win with only prob-
ability pi = (1 − ρ)pi. When trial outcomes are perfectly correlated, pi = 1 and pi = 0, and when
trial outcomes are independent, pi = pi = pi. The positive correlation in trial outcomes emerges
naturally in sequential litigation for many reasons—courts may follow precedents established in
the initial trial, and the culpability or vulnerability of the defendant are similar across cases, or the
characteristic of the plaintiffs are similar as well. As a result, this positive correlation is often high.
If a plaintiff files a case, then it either (a) is settled out of court with the plaintiff accepting
the defendant’s take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer, (b) is withdrawn by the plaintiff, or (c) goes to
trial.8 A plaintiff’s net payoff is zero if he does not file, and it is any payment from the defendant
less his litigation costs if he files. Litigation costs include costs of expert witness, discovery, mo-
tions and hearings. A defendant’s costs may also include bad publicity. In practice, litigation costs
are incurred on a continuous basis and the timing of a settlement is itself endogenous. To simplify
presentation, we collapse this continuous process into a discrete process, dividing costs into pre-
trial costs that must be incurred before a defendant makes a settlement offer or goes to trial, and
trial costs that must be incurred to obtain a verdict from the court. We denote date-t pre-trial costs
by kpt ≥ 0. If a lawsuit then goes to trial, a date-t plaintiff must pay the additional trial costs of
cpt ≥ 0. Recalling the definition of date 1 as the first moment at which a serious plaintiff found
it worthwhile to file a lawsuit, there is an implicit premise that the potential gains to the plaintiff
from filing exceed the costs, i.e., pim1 ≥ cp1 + kp1. This admits the possibility that the first case is
in some way “unusual”.
If a lawsuit is filed against the defendant at date t,D incurs pre-trial costs of kdt > 0. If the case
8We allow the plaintiff to withdraw a negative expected value lawsuit to ensure that a plaintiff who has a meritless
case cannot simply enter with a commitment to go to trial if there is no settlement and thereby extort money from a
defendant. See Rosenberg and Shavell (1985) and Bebchuk (1988).
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then goes to trial, D incurs additional trial costs of cdt > 0. The dating allows for the possibility
that initial trial costs may exceed those in subsequent trials. For example, in subsequent cases, a
defendant’s expert may need less time to prepare, and much of the discovery work has been done.9
The defendant’s payoff is her initial wealth W less any payments made to plaintiffs and litiga-
tion costs incurred. We assume that the defendant is wealthy enough that there are no bankruptcy
concerns.10 It eases presentation to describe the defendant’s payoffs as net of her initial wealth.
The timing is as follows: (1) Date 1: Along the equilibrium path P1 files a lawsuit. (2)D makes
a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer s1 ∈ [0,∞) to P1. (3) P1 chooses whether to withdraw the
case, accept the offer, or reject the offer. If P1 accepts the offer, he is paid s1. If P1 rejects the offer,
the case goes to trial. (4) The date-1 trial outcome is realized and payment is made. (5) Date 2:
All date-2 plaintiffs observe date-1 outcomes and decide whether to enter. (6) D makes take-it-or-
leave-it settlement offers s2 ∈ [0,∞) to date-2 plaintiffs who file. (7) Each date-2 plaintiff chooses
whether to withdraw his case, accept the offer, or reject the offer. A plaintiff who accepts the offer
is paid s2. Date-2 cases that are not settled or withdrawn go to trial. (8) Date-2 trial outcomes are
realized and payments are made. Figure 1 shows the timing.
We analyze the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game. Since the defendant makes take-it-
or-leave-it offers, in equilibrium a plaintiff must always accept an offer when indifferent between
accepting or not, since an infinitesimally higher settlement offer would break the indifference. To
ease exposition, we assume that when indifferent between entering and not entering, a plaintiff
chooses not to enter. This allows us to make “if and only if” statements.
We solve for equilibrium outcomes recursively. The probability that a date-2 plaintiff wins
can depend on the outcome of date-1 litigation. We denote the posterior probability that a date-2
plaintiff wins by q. Since both D and P1 have no private information, neither a date-1 settle-
ment nor a withdrawal of a suit by P1 conveys information to potential date-2 plaintiffs about their
probabilities of winning in trial, so following either of these outcomes, their posteriors remain
q = pi. In contrast, a date-1 trial serves as a test or signal that conveys information to potential
date-2 plaintiffs: following a plaintiff-win, their posteriors optimistically rise to pi, but following
a defendant-win, their posteriors pessimistically fall to pi. By the Law of Iterated Expectations,
9One can also model the possibility that date-2 costs, kd2 and cd2, depend on the history. Plausibly date-2 costs
could depend on whether a previous case settles or goes to trial. Allowing a date-1 trial to reduce a defendant’s date-2
trial costs (e.g., because she need not duplicate trial preparation efforts) or to reduce the date-2 trial costs of an initial
plaintiff’s lawyer who also has a stake in future cases creates additional, straightforward incentives to go to trial.
10Bankruptcy concerns (e.g., with asbestos litigation) create incentives for a defendant to go to trial in the first liti-
gation because the limited liability bounds her downside risk. We ignore this occasionally important, but well-studied
(Spier 2002), incentive to go to trial, in order to focus on other strategic incentives to go to trial in sequential litigation.
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Nature
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not 
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P2 …
P2
…
withdraw
Figure 1: Timing of the game
pipi+ (1−pi)pi = pi. Thus, at date 2, q ∈ {pi, pi, pi}. We begin with a preliminary result establishing
that once learning about trial outcomes has occurred, all cases will be settled.
Lemma 1. Date-2 plaintiffs enter if and only if qm2 > kp2 + cp2. Along the equilibrium path, after
entry, D settles every date-2 case by offering each date-2 plaintiff qm2 − cp2.
This lemma conveys how and when the outcome of the initial litigation affects the decisions by
future potential date-2 plaintiffs on whether or not to file lawsuits:
Proposition 1. Decisions by date-2 plaintiffs to file lawsuits depend on the resolution of the initial
case as follows:
Case 1. pim2 ≤ kp2 + cp2. Date-2 plaintiffs do not enter regardless of the date-1 outcome.
Case 2. pim2 ≤ kp2+cp2 < pim2. Date-2 plaintiffs enter if and only if the plaintiff wins a date-1 trial.
Case 3. pim2 ≤ kp2 + cp2 < pim2. Date-2 plaintiffs enter unless the defendant wins a date-1 trial.
Case 4. kp2 + cp2 < pim2. Date-2 plaintiffs enter regardless of the date-1 outcome.
In Cases 1 and 4, date-1 outcomes do not affect date-2 entry decisions by plaintiffs. In Case
2, a date-1 trial encourages entry relative to a date-1 settlement, because a plaintiff-win causes
future plaintiffs to update sufficiently optimistically about their chances that they file, when they
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otherwise would not. In contrast, in Case 3, a date-1 trial discourages entry relative to a settlement,
by causing future plaintiffs to update sufficiently negatively about their chances following a win
by the defendant that they choose not to file, when they otherwise would file.
Thus, in Case 3, a date-1 trial deters entry with probability 1 − pi. When deciding whether to
settle the initial plaintiff lawsuit, or to fight it at a trial, the defendant weighs the impact of possible
date-1 trial outcomes on decisions of potential future plaintiffs to file. We now show that a nec-
essary condition for the defendant not to settle the initial case is that a defense-win is required to
deter future plaintiffs from filing. An implication is that a sequential litigation structure is neces-
sary for a trial to occur at date 1. Specifically, if N2 = 0, so there are no future potential plaintiffs,
or if ρ = 0, so that a date-1 trial outcome has no bearing on date-2 outcomes, then a trial never
occurs in equilibrium: the logic in Lemma 1 implies that D will settle with plaintiff P1 at date 1.
The full necessary and sufficient conditions for the initial lawsuit to go to trial are as follows:
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, when the plaintiff makes all legal decisions, the initial case goes to
trial if and only if the following conditions on the date-2 litigation both hold:
1. Future lawsuits can be deterred, but only if the defendant wins the initial trial: pim2 ≤
kp2 + cp2 < pim2,
2. The benefits to the defendant from possibly deterring date-2 lawsuits outweigh the extra
date-1 trial costs: (1− pi)(pim2 − cp2 + kd2)N2 > cp1 + cd1.
Condition 1 just restates the conditions for Case 3 in Proposition 1. To understand Condition
2, let USt denote D’s date-t payoff from settling at date 1 with the lowest acceptable offer, and let
UTt denote D’s date-t payoff from going to trial at date 1 (by making an unacceptable offer). Let
US ≡ US1 + US2 , and UT ≡ UT1 + UT2 .
Following a settlement, the posterior is pi, so D’s payoff from date-2 litigation is:
US2 = (−pim2 + cp2 − kd2)N2.
Following a trial, there are two possibilities. If the outcome was a plaintiff-win, the posterior be-
comes pi and D’s payoff is (−pim2 + cp2 − kd2)N2 because D would offer pim2 − cp2 to each
plaintiff that then enters. If the outcome was a defendant-win, the posterior is pi and D’s payoff is
0 because no plaintiff enters. Therefore, D’s expected payoff at date 2 following a date-1 trial is:
UT2 = pi(−pim2 + cp2 − kd2)N2.
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Contrasting D’s date-1 payoff from a trial versus a settlement, the trial brings a loss of US1 −UT1 =
cp1 + cd1 at date 1 because D incurs her trial cost and fails to make an offer which, due to the
take-it-or-leave-it offer structure, could have extracted the rents from P1 circumventing her trial
costs. However, the possible gain at date 2, UT2 − US2 , from a defendant-win that discourages
future plaintiffs from filing may outweigh it. The difference is:
UT − US = (UT2 − US2 )− (US1 − UT1 ) = (1− pi)(pim2 − cp2 + kd2)N2 − (cp1 + cd1).
Condition 2 in Proposition 2 is exactly the condition that UT > US .
Proposition 2 shows that a defendant’s incentive to take the initial case to trial does not rise
monotonically with the future litigation stakes, m2. The future stakes must be high enough to
make it worthwhile for D to deter future plaintiffs from filing (Condition 2), and they must be high
enough that a settlement does not deter date-2 plaintiffs from entering. However, the stakes cannot
be so high that future plaintiffs still want to go to trial even if the defendant wins the initial trial.
Relatedly, a defendant’s incentive to take the initial case to trial is not monotone in the prior,
pi. From Condition 1, if the prior that a plaintiff will win is too high, then the defendant cannot
deter future plaintiffs; and conversely, if pi is too low, then a defendant need not go to trial to deter
future plaintiffs. There is also an important subtlety in how the prior enters Condition 2: A higher
pi implies that deterring entry is more difficult as pi is higher; but conditional on deterring entry,
a higher pi means that the defendant saves more from deterring entry (as the settlement payment
upon entry would have been higher).
A defendant can gain from deterring date-2 plaintiffs for two reasons: (1)D saves by not incur-
ring pre-trial cost kd2, and (2) it may reduce the expected settlement payment to date-2 plaintiffs.
Interestingly, this reduction in expected settlement payments can happen only because a plaintiff’s
pre-trial cost kp2 is positive. To understand why, let h(q) be the settlement payment to a date 2
plaintiff who would win with probability q, and first consider kp2 = 0. When qm2 − cp2 < 0,
date-2 plaintiffs would not enter, and the settlement payment would be 0; and when qm2 +cp2 > 0,
the settlement payment h(q) is positive and linear in q. Therefore, h(q) = max{qm2− cp2, 0} (see
Figure 2(a)). Since h(q) is a convex function of q, by Jensen’s Inequality, E[h(q)] > h(E[q]). That
is, the expected settlement payment under a date-1 trial that spreads the beliefs to pi and pi exceeds
that following a date-1 settlement that keeps beliefs at pi. Now consider kp2 > 0. The settlement
payment is 0 whenever qm2 − cp2 − kp2 < 0, so the settlement payment takes the form in Figure
2(b). However, h(q) is no longer convex, and there is an interval of the prior probability pi for
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which E[h(q)] < h(E[q]).11 On this range of the prior probability, a defendant-win deters date-2
plaintiffs who would extract positive settlements from D were they to enter (but not a large enough
settlement to cover their pre-trial costs of kp2 to give them incentives to enter). When this happens,
the expected future settlement payments are reduced by spreading beliefs via a date-1 trial.
qm2 – cp2
  q
Settlement 
Payment to P2 qm2 – cp2
  q
Settlement 
Payment to P2
kp2
kp2 =0
Figure 2: (a) settlement payment if kp2 = 0; (b) settlement payment if kp2 > 0.
Importantly, the circumstances under which the initial case goes to trial grow with the two cen-
tral features of sequential litigation: (1) the number N2 of subsequent cases whose trial outcomes
would be affected by the initial trial outcome, and (2) the extent to which trial outcomes are cor-
related. That is, the larger is N2, the greater is a defendant’s gain from deterring future lawsuits;
and the greater is the correlation in trial outcomes, the more negatively plaintiffs update following
a defendant-win, spreading the difference in beliefs pi − pi about future trial outcomes following a
settlement versus a defendant-win, making it “easier” for a defendant-win to deter entry. A caveat
to this observation is that increased correlation in trial outcomes also reduces the benefit that the
defendant derives from actually deterring entry (i.e., Condition 2 is harder to satisfy). However,
when N2 is large enough, the savings from deterring entry exceed the one set of trial costs in-
curred, so the crucial condition becomes the ability for the defendant to deter future plaintiffs with
a defendant-win.
The conditions under which substantial learning in sequential litigation causes the initial case
to go to trial are quite plausible. In particular, the potential savings on future pre-trial costs can
be more than enough to cover the costs incurred in a single trial. Nonetheless, there is a limited
extent to which learning on its own will lead to trials. First, once precedents have been established
and potential plaintiffs have updated about their prospects at trial, any future lawsuits that are filed
will be settled. Second, only a limited set of combinations of the prior pi and trial stakes m2 causes
future potential plaintiffs to be deterred by a defendant-win, but not by a settlement. We next con-
11The interval for pi is (max{ cp2m2(1−ρ) ,
cp2+kp2−m2ρ
m2(1−ρ) },
cp2+kp2
m2(1−ρ) ].
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sider a variety of scenarios in which additional properties of sequential litigation increase the set
of circumstances under which trials emerge.
2.1 Delegation to Plaintiff Attorney
In practice, plaintiffs often delegate legal decisions to their attorneys. To highlight the conse-
quences of such delegation by the plaintiff, we suppose that the defendant continues to make
the decisions for the defense. This latter assumption captures the observation that a defendant’s
attorney’s interest is typically aligned with the defendant, for example because the attorney is an
in-house counsel and/or in a repeated relationship with the defendant. We first show that delegation
does not change our qualitative findings if the date-1 plaintiff’s attorney has no stake in future cases.
We denote a date-t plaintiff attorney by PAt. We first assume that the initial plaintiff’s attorney,
PA1 has no date-2 clients. A plaintiff’s attorney is paid on a pure contingent fee basis, receiving
a fraction β ∈ (0, 1] of any settlement/damage. We take the commission rate β as an exogenous
industry standard and assume that litigation costs are entirely borne by the attorneys. Here, β = 1
corresponds to our no-delegation, base-case, scenario. When β < 1, a plaintiff attorney has a lesser
incentive to enter litigation than the plaintiff himself, because the attorney only receives a fraction
β of the reward, but incurs all of the costs. Thus, the condition underlying the maintained premise
that P1 is the initial plaintiff to file becomes more stringent: βpim1 > cp1 + kp1.12 The rest of the
setup mirrors our base-case formulation, and the analysis follows similarly.
Now, given a probability q of winning at date 2, if βqm2 ≤ cp2, the defendant would offer a
settlement of zero to any plaintiff who enters. If, instead, βqm2 > cp2, then the lowest settlement
offer that a date-2 plaintiff’s attorney would accept is:
βs2 = βqm2 − cp2 ⇒ s2 = qm2 − cp2
β
.
Compared to when plaintiffs’ legal decisions are not delegated, from the defendant’s perspective,
it is as if the plaintiff’s costs are scaled up by 1
β
. Since the plaintiff’s attorney only receives β
share of any payments, he puts more weight on his costs than on the stakes of a case. Thus, in
his decision making, it is as if the stakes are unchanged, but costs are inflated by 1
β
. As a result, a
defendant can reduce her settlement offer. On the plaintiff’s side, compared to the date-1 plaintiff,
his attorney views both the payment and the costs incurred by the defendant as scaled down by β.
12This condition is sufficient for the initial case to go to trial in all other scenarios considered. The point that an attor-
ney under a contingent fee has less incentive to bring a lawsuit and less incentive to go to trial is made by Miller (1987).
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Relative to the base-case scenario, when a plaintiff’s attorney makes legal decisions, date-2
entry conditions are only altered by the weight β placed on payoffs:
Proposition 3. When date-2 decisions to file lawsuits are made by a plaintiff’s attorney, their entry
decisions depend on the outcome of the date-1 lawsuit as follows:
Case 1. βpim2 ≤ kp2 + cp2. No plaintiffs enter, regardless of date-1 outcomes.
Case 2. βpim2 ≤ kp2 + cp2 < βpim2. Date-2 plaintiffs enter if and only if the plaintiff wins a date-1
trial.
Case 3. βpim2 ≤ kp2 + cp2 < βpim2. Date-2 plaintiffs enter unless the defendant wins a date-1 trial.
Case 4. kp2 + cp2 < βpim2. Date-2 plaintiffs enter regardless of date-1 outcomes.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, when the plaintiff’s attorney makes all legal decisions, the initial
case goes to trial if and only if the following conditions on date-2 litigation both hold:
1. A date-1 defendant-win is required to deter a plaintiff’s attorney from filing date-2 lawsuits:
βpim2 ≤ kp2 + cp2 < βpim2,
2. The benefit to the defendant from possibly deterring date-2 lawsuits outweigh the extra date-
1 trial costs: (1− pi)(pim2 − cp2β + kd2)N2 > cp1β + cd1.
The result and proof mirror those for Proposition 2, save that the requisite adjustments in the
stakes in Condition 1 and the plaintiff’s costs in Condition 2. Only the stakes in condition 1, and
not the costs are adjusted, while only the costs and not the stakes are adjusted in Condition 2.
This is because Condition 1 is from the perspective of the plaintiff, while Condition 2 is from the
perspective of the defendant. For the defendant, the expected difference between the payoffs from
a date-1 trial and a date-1 settlement becomes:
UT − US = (1− pi)(pim2 − cp2
β
+ kd2)N2 − (cp1
β
+ cd1).
This gives Condition 2.
2.2 Date-1 attorney represents future plaintiffs
We have assumed that the initial plaintiff’s attorney is not involved in date-2 litigation. How-
ever, in practice, an attorney may repeatedly engage in litigation against the same defendant. We
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now consider how outcomes are affected when the date-1 plaintiff’s attorney may represent future
plaintiffs. We first study the case where the outcome of date-1 litigation does not affect his share
of potential date-2 clients.
Suppose that regardless of date-1 litigation outcomes, PA1 will represent share α ∈ [0, 1] of
date-2 plaintiffs, where α = 0 corresponds to the base-case scenario analyzed in Section 2.1. We
now show that the greater are PA1’s future business ties, the greater are the circumstances under
which the defendant decides to take the initial case to trial.
Proposition 5. The greater is the share α of future plaintiffs that the initial plaintiff’s attorney will
represent, the more attractive it is for the defendant to take the initial case to trial. In equilibrium,
the initial lawsuit goes to trial if and only if the following conditions on date-2 litigation both hold:
1. Future lawsuits can be deterred, but only if the defendant wins the initial trial: βpim2 ≤
kp2 + cp2 < βpim2,
2. The benefit to the defendant from possibly deterring date-2 lawsuits outweigh the extra date-
1 trial costs: (1− pi)(pim2 − cp2β + kd2)N2 + (1− pi)( cp2+kp2β − pim2)αN2 > cp1β + cd1.
Condition 1 for a trial is unchanged from that in Proposition 4. However, the possibility of
repeat business makes it easier to satisfy Condition 2. When the date-1 plaintiff’s attorney has a
future stake in date-2 outcomes, he begins to care about differences in the information revealed by
a date-1 trial versus a settlement. When a defendant’s win deters entry—a necessary condition for
a date-1 trial to emerge—it follows that a date-1 trial reveals information to the plaintiff’s attorney
that helps him fine tune date-2 decisions about whether to file lawsuits. Now, the attorney only files
future lawsuits when the chances of winning are high, and hence the settlement offer is high. In
this way, a date-1 trial increases the attorney’s expected date-2 payoff. Consequently, to settle the
initial case, the defendant must compensate PA1 for this loss of information. This more expensive
settlement raises the attraction of a trial to the defendant.
Let V T2 denote PA1’s expected date-2 payoff when there is a date-1 trial, and V
S
2 denote his
corresponding payoff when there is a settlement. Then compared to when the plaintiff’s attorney
has no future clients, the defendant must increase her settlement offer s1 by
V T2 −V S2
β
to compensate
the attorney for the foregone value of information that could be revealed at a trial, where
V T2 − V S2
β
= (1− pi)(cp2 + kp2
β
− pim2)αN2 > 0.
Condition 1 implies that this term is positive. This is exactly the term added to the LHS of Con-
dition 2 compared to its counterpart in Proposition 4. The conditions favoring a trial are enhanced
15
precisely because any settlement offer must contain this extra compensation to induce the initial
plaintiff to forgo learning about future trial outcomes by going to trial in the initial case. That is,
the gain of a trial over a settlement here is the original date-2 gain with a plaintiff attorney who has
no future business considerations plus the information benefit of a trial V
T
2 −V S2
β
:
UT − US = (1− pi)(pim2 − cp2
β
+ kd2)N2 − (cp1
β
+ cd1) + (1− pi)(cp2 + kp2
β
− pim2)αN2.
It also follows that the conditions under which it is optimal for the initial plaintiff’s attorney to
engage in the initial litigation are relaxed compared to when he has no stakes in future litigation.13
The greater is the share α of future plaintiffs that the initial plaintiff represents, the more at-
tractive a trial is to D relative to a settlement, because PA1 internalizes more of the information-
revealing benefit of a trial. In fact, when PA1 represents all future potential plaintiffs, i.e., when
α = 1, the decision of whether or not to take the initial case to trial maximizes the “joint surplus”
of the defendant and plaintiff’s attorney with PA1’s costs inflated by 1β . Thus, the choice to go to
trial hinges on a comparison of the costs of deterring entry, cp1
β
+ cd1, with the benefits, which is
just the saving of date-2 pre-trial costs, (1− pi)(kp2
β
+ kd2).
It is worth observing that when Condition 1 holds, but Condition 2 does not, so the initial case
is settled, the initial plaintiff benefits from the increased settlement offer associated with an attor-
ney who will engage in future litigation against the defendant. This implies that plaintiffs wants to
seek out an attorney with future potential “conflicts of interest” of this form because they serve to
commit the attorney to bargaining more strongly at date 1, demanding to be compensated for the
value of information lost in a settlement.
2.3 Plaintiff lawyer incentives to attract future clients
We now model the possibility that the share of future plaintiffs is not fixed from the perspective of
date 1. In particular, potential plaintiffs may rely on the payment received by the initial plaintiff
to assess the quality of his attorney. If the initial plaintiff’s lawyer extracts a larger settlement, or
wins a greater payment at trial, then he may attract more future clients. Advertisements by lawyers
highlighting the size of settlements and trial awards won by their clients indicate that potential
plaintiffs weigh them heavily in their choices of legal representation.
We do not model the informational primitives underlying why and how potential plaintiffs use
the past payments to plaintiffs to learn about attorneys, because such details are unimportant given
13The conditions for PA1 to enter at date 1 become βpim1 > cp1 + kp1 − (1− pi)(cp2 + kp2 − βpim2)αN2.
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our focus.14 Rather, for simplicity, we assume that the date-1 plaintiff’s attorney has a base of
date-2 clients of size αN2. On top of that, if he extracts a sufficiently high payment for his date-1
client, x1 ≥ w, then all date-2 plaintiffs with cases against the defendant choose him to represent
them.15 Thus, the cutoff w (< m1) simply measures what constitutes “doing well enough” for the
date-1 client that all date-2 plaintiffs conclude that he is a good attorney and seek out his services.16
In particular, a date-1 trial victory for the plaintiff always encourages future plaintiffs to choose
PA1 as their attorney. Then, as a function of x1, PA1 expects to represent share α(x1) of date-2
potential plaintiffs, where
α(x1) =
{
1, if x1 ≥ w
α, otherwise.
To focus on the intertemporal linkages generated by the dependence of the initial plaintiff’s at-
torney’s future client base on date-1 outcomes and how it can cause the defendant to take the initial
case to trial, we assume away all correlation in trial outcomes, setting ρ = 0. As a result, date-1
trial outcomes contain no information about date-2 outcomes, pi = pi = pi. Without any learning,
date-1 outcomes do not affect the number of date-2 plaintiffs, so that this incentive to go to trial to
deter future plaintiffs vanishes. Nonetheless, as we now show, the defendant may choose to go to
trial rather than increase the settlement offer by enough to satisfy the initial plaintiff’s attorney’s
desire to attract future clients.
Proposition 6. Suppose that trial outcomes are uncorrelated, but the initial plaintiff attorney’s
share of future plaintiffs rises by 1 − α if his initial client receives compensation of at least w.
Then the initial lawsuit goes to trial at date 1 if and only if
1. w > pim1 + cd1, and
2. pi(1− α)(pim2 − cp2+kp2β )N2 > cd1 + cp1β .
Condition 1 says that the defendant prefers having a trial at date 1 to settling at w consid-
ering only her date-1 payoff. Note that the defendant does not care who represents the plain-
tiffs at date 2: from the defendant’s perspective, date-2 outcomes are not affected by whether
or not she goes to trial at date 1. The minimal acceptable offer to the plaintiff’s attorney is
s1 = pim1 − cp1β + pi(1 − α)(pim2 − cp2+kp2β )N2, reflecting that a trial brings an extra (1 − α)
14In our model, plaintiffs are otherwise indifferent to their selections of attorneys, so that any selection is optimal.
15This structure is without loss of generality: the plaintiff’s attorney’s decisions only hinge on the difference 1−α,
i.e., he would make the same decisions if shares are α1 if x1 < w, and α2 if x1 ≥ w, where α2 − α1 = 1− α.
16Incentives to go to trial would be further reinforced if the initial outcome also affected the initial plaintiff’s
attorney ability to attract future plaintiffs in cases unrelated to the current defendant.
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share of the date-2 market with probability pi. Condition 2 says that the costs of a settlement, i.e.,
the incremental cost of compensating the plaintiff for the extra share, exceed the benefits, i.e., the
saving in the trial costs of the defendant plus the appropriately-weighted trial costs of the plaintiff’s
lawyer. It follows that a trial is preferred.
Increases in the market share 1 − α of date-2 plaintiffs that a date-1 plaintiff’s lawyer would
obtain if he wins at least w for his client, or increases in the number N2 of date-2 plaintiffs that
raise the value of that share, both increase the payment that a defendant must pay to obtain a set-
tlement, making a trial more attractive to her. Increases in the likelihood pi that a plaintiff wins
at trial have possibly opposing effects. Increases in pi not only raise the stakes in the initial trial,
but also the value of the future market share that only PA1 cares about. The defendant does not
want to compensate PA1 for the added value of that future market share when she does not care
who represents future plaintiffs, and this makes Condition 2 easier to satisfy; but, the increases in
pi also mean that paying w to settle becomes a smaller mark-up over what the defendant expects to
pay in a trial, and this makes Condition 1 harder to satisfy. Similarly, a higher date-1 payout m1 to
a plaintiff who wins favors a settlement with an offer at w at date 1, while higher date-2 payouts
m2 favor a date-1 trial. Finally, note that the defendant’s date-2 pre-trial cost, kd2, no longer enters
decisions of whether or not to go to trial. This is because we have assumed away all correlation in
trial outcomes, and without learning, date-1 outcomes do not affect the number of date-2 plaintiffs,
eliminating this source for trials.17
3 Meritless Cases
We now return to our base case setting where trial outcomes are positively correlated and the plain-
tiff makes legal decisions in order to investigate how the existence of future meritless cases (cases
without merits) can lead to trials. We first show how meritless cases at date 2 can give rise to trials
at date 2. We then show how such date-2 meritless cases increase the circumstances under which
the initial date-1 case, which is known to have merits, goes to trial. In part, this reflects that a date-1
win by a defendant that deters future plaintiff cases with merits, also deters future meritless cases.
More subtly, expected payouts to future plaintiffs can be a concave function of date-2 beliefs about
the probability of a plaintiff-win by a serious case due to the endogenous decisions to file meritless
lawsuits. This creates an added incentive for a defendant to spread beliefs by going to trial at date 1.
17Also note that the maintained premise that it is optimal for the initial lawsuit to be filed is relaxed relative to the
base-case scenario to βpim1 − (cp1 + kp1) + pi(1− α)(βpim2 − cp2 − kp2)N2 > 0.
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We modify our base-case model so that there is now a potential supply FN2 of meritless cases
at date 2. These are cases that have a surface similarity with serious cases, but their lack of merit
would be revealed in a trial. Our base-case scenario corresponds to F = 0. Meritless cases in-
cur the same litigation costs as serious ones. The only difference is that meritless cases never
win in court. A plaintiff knows whether his case has merits, but the defendant does not. To ease
analysis, we assume that the defendant’s strategy at date 2 is a mapping from the posterior to a
settlement offer—the defendant does not condition date-2 decisions on the number of cases filed.18
Our analysis also ignores three hairline parameter cases, pim2 = cp2 + kp2, pim2 = cp2 + kp2 and
pim2 = cp2 + kp2, to avoid having to analyze uninteresting subgame equilibriums that only exist in
these hairline cases. Our maintained assumption is that the very first case has merits.
We next characterize date-2 litigation outcomes when the posterior probability that a serious
case wins in court is updated to q following date-1 litigation outcomes.
Lemma 2. (1) If qm2 > cp2 + kp2 and F > cp2+kp2qm2−cp2 , then in the date-2 subgame, the defendant’s
equilibrium payoffs are unique. All plaintiffs with serious cases file, and the expected number of
meritless lawsuits is cp2+cd2
qm2−cp2N2. To any plaintiff that files, D offers a settlement qm2 − cp2 with
probability kp2
qm2−cp2 and goes to trial with the complementary probability.
(2) If qm2 > cp2 + kp2 and F ≤ cp2+kp2qm2−cp2 , then in the unique date-2 subgame equilibrium, all
plaintiffs file lawsuits, regardless of their merits. D offers qm2 − cp2 to settle each lawsuit.
(3) If qm2 < cp2 + kp2, no plaintiffs file lawsuits at date 2.
In part (1) of Lemma 2 where there are many potential meritless cases, the mixed strategy
equilibria reflect the “matching pennies” nature of the game. If too many meritless cases enter, D
would want to go to trial rather than settle all cases with an offer high enough that plaintiffs with
serious cases would accept. But, then meritless lawsuits would not be filed. If, instead, meritless
suits are unlikely, D wants to settle. But then plaintiffs want to file meritless lawsuits. As a result,
in any equilibrium, D adopts a mixed strategy of sometimes pursuing a trial, and sometimes set-
tling. Only the expected number of meritless cases enter a defendant’s payoffs, so in addition to
the symmetric equilibrium in which plaintiffs with meritless cases mix with a common probability,
asymmetric equilibria also exist in which some plaintiffs with meritless cases always file, and some
18This is only relevant in the range characterized by a mixed strategy equilibrium, where the number of cases
conveys information about the realized number of meritless cases filed. An equilibrium exists in which the number
of meritless cases filed never differs by more than one. If N2 is re-interpreted as an ex-ante expected number of
serious date-2 cases, none of our other analysis is altered, and the total number of cases can convey arbitrarily little
information about the number of meritless cases filed, and hence have arbitrarily little effect on a defendant’s behavior.
We ignore this for simplicity, as it does not qualitatively affect date-1 decisions to go to trial.
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(or just one) mix between filing or not.
When a serious case is more likely to win at trial, the minimum acceptable settlement offer
for a plaintiff with a serious case rises. This has two important implications. First, because the
settlement offer is increased, in order to deter plaintiffs with meritless cases from filing, the de-
fendant must be more likely to take a date-2 case to trial. Second, fewer meritless cases must be
filed on average. Because the defendant must pay more to settle a serious case, it becomes more
worthwhile for the defendant to weed out meritless cases. Thus, it takes fewer meritless cases to
keep the defendant indifferent between paying the higher settlement offer and going to trial.
Part (2) reflects that when most cases have merit, the defendant prefers to settle all cases, pay-
ing a few unnecessary settlements, but avoiding trial costs. Plaintiffs with serious cases still enter
if and only if qm2 > cp2 + kp2: the existence of meritless cases does not affect how serious cases
react to date-1 litigation outcomes. Thus, Proposition 1 still characterizes their equilibrium behav-
ior. At the same time, plaintiffs with meritless cases do not enter when those with serious cases do
not enter, as part (3) of Lemma 2 indicates. Lemma 3 describes the consequences for a defendant’s
expected payoffs in future litigation.
Lemma 3. When a serious plaintiff expects to win a date-2 trial with probability q, the defendant’s
date-2 expected payoff is:
g(q) ≡

0, if q < cp2+kp2
m2
,
(−qm2 + cp2 − kd2)N2(1 + F ), if cp2+kp2m2 < q < 1m2 (
cp2+cd2
F
+ cp2),
(−qm2 + cp2 − kd2)N2(1 + cp2+cd2qm2−cp2 ), if q > max{
cp2+kp2
m2
, 1
m2
( cp2+cd2
F
+ cp2)}
The function g(q) is continuous and weakly convex for q > cp2+kp2
m2
. Moreover, when kd2(cp2 +
cd2) > 0, it is strictly convex on the “mixed strategy range” of q > max{ cp2+kp2m2 , 1m2 (
cp2+cd2
F
+cp2)},
where the defendant mixes between settling and going to trial.
When serious cases are too unlikely to win, no cases are filed at date 2, so D does not pay
out anything. For an intermediate range of posterior probabilities q (non-empty if and only if F
is small enough), all plaintiffs file, regardless of the merits of their cases, because there are not
enough meritless cases to make it worthwhile for D to go to trial to weed them out. When q and F
are larger, all plaintiffs with serious cases file, but only some of those with meritless cases do, and
the defendant responds by mixing between settling and going to trial.
The defendant’s payout −g(q) is concave over the range of q with positive date-2 entry. The
payout rises linearly with q on the range where all meritless cases enter because the expected pay-
out to a serious case in trial, qm2, is linear in q and the number of cases filed N2(1 + F ) does not
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vary with q. Once the probability that a plaintiff with a serious case is high enough that only some
meritless cases are filed, the payout becomes strictly concave in q due to the nature of the mixed
strategy equilibria. When q is higher (a more promising case for serious plaintiffs), to keepD indif-
ferent between settling and going to trial, fewer meritless cases are filed. Thus, when the higher q
raises the requisite settlement offer, the reduction in meritless cases filed partially offsets the higher
payout to plaintiffs relative to a linear increase. Conversely, when q is lower (a less promising case
for plaintiffs), more meritless cases file, which partially offsets the decrease in payout relative to
a linear decrease. Therefore, the defendant’s expected payout to plaintiffs is a strictly concave
function of q on the mixed strategy range of q, i.e., when the defendant’s payoff is strictly convex.
Proposition 7. The circumstances under which a trial occurs increases in the proportion of poten-
tial meritless cases, F . In equilibrium, the initial case goes to trial if and only if either of the two
following scenarios on date-2 litigation hold:
Scenario 1: 1. pim2 ≤ kp2 + cp2 < pim2, 2. pig(pi)− g(pi) > cp1 + cd1,
Scenario 2: 3. kp2 + cp2 < pim2, 4. pig(pi) + (1− pi)g(pi)− g(pi) > cp1 + cd1.
It is useful to contrast this result with our base case characterization in Proposition 2. In sce-
nario 1, Condition 1 is the standard condition that a date-1 trial deters entry following a date-1
defendant-win, but a settlement does not. As in Proposition 2, Condition 2 says that the benefit
from the reduction in date-2 costs due to the possibility of deterring entry more than offsets the
costs of a date-1 trial. However, this condition is now easier to satisfy because the presence of
meritless cases increases the gains from deterring entry by going to trial at date 1. The LHS of
Condition 2 not only includes the reduction in expected payouts to serious cases, but also the ex-
pected reduction in payouts to meritless cases. Indeed, a trial may reduce an even greater expected
proportion of meritless cases than of serious ones. For example, when pi and pi are both in the mixed
strategy range, a trial reduces the probability of meritless cases from cp2+cd2
(pim2−cp2)F to pi
cp2+cd2
(pim2−cp2)F ;
the percentage reduction is greater for meritless cases since pi < pi. So, too, when pi is not in the
mixed strategy range, but pi is, the reduction in their entry probability is from 1 to pi cp2+cd2
(pim2−cp2)F .
Scenario 2 says that even when a defendant-win fails to deter plaintiffs who have serious cases
(Condition 3), when Condition 4 holds, the gains from deterring meritless cases still make it worth-
while to go to trial at date 1, due to the convexity of g(q). Going to trial causes date-2 beliefs to
diverge relative to a settlement, and because more meritless cases are now deterred when date-2
settlements are high (q = pi), than when they are low (q = pi), the associated gain (the LHS of Con-
dition 4) may exceed the cost of a date-1 trial (the RHS of Condition 4). Indeed, in this scenario,
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in contrast to all previous scenarios analyzed, it can be optimal for the plaintiff to go to trial at date
1 even when there are no pre-trial cost savings, i.e., even when kp2 = kd2 = 0. When kd2 = 0,
the payout is a piece-wise linear (concave) function of the posterior, because fewer meritless cases
enter when the posterior is high enough.
When a defendant is sufficiently likely to take date-2 cases to trial, she deters all meritless cases.
This might lead one to wonder whether and when a defendant would be better off if she could com-
mit to taking all date-2 cases to trial. Such commitment completely deters all meritless lawsuits,
but it also incurs trial costs against all serious plaintiffs. We now show that when a plaintiff with
a serious case is sufficiently likely to win at date 2, a defendant would be better off committing to
taking all cases to trial at the beginning of date 2 than she is in an equilibrium without commitment.
Proposition 8. If and only if (a) there are enough plaintiffs who can file meritless cases, and (b) a
plaintiff is likely enough to win at trial, a defendant would like to commit to going to trial at date-2:
1. When q < cp2+kp2
m2
, no plaintiffs file lawsuits, so commitment does not matter.
2. When cp2+kp2
m2
< q < 1
m2
( cp2+cd2
F
+cp2−kd2), a defendant is better off not committing to trials.
3. When q > max{ cp2+kp2
m2
, 1
m2
( cp2+cd2
F
+cp2−kd2)}, a defendant is strictly better off committing
to trials at date-2 as long as kd2 > 0.
In situation 2, a plaintiff is sufficiently likely to win that plaintiffs file lawsuits, but a defendant
is better off settling all cases, as the requisite settlement is not that high and/or there are not that
many potential meritless cases. When q and F are large enough that q > max{ cp2+kp2
m2
, 1
m2
( cp2+cd2
F
+
cp2−kd2)} (situation 3), a defendant would be better off committing to taking all cases to trial (pro-
vided her pre-trial costs are positive), in order to deter all meritless lawsuits.
4 Nash Bargaining
We have assumed that the defendant makes take-it-or-leave-it offers. However, our qualitative
findings are unchanged if plaintiffs have more bargaining power. We illustrate this in the context
where a plaintiff’s attorney, who only represents his current client, makes all litigation decisions.
Suppose now that plaintiff attorneys have bargaining power λ ∈ (0, 1) and the defendant has
bargaining power 1− λ. Let V be the outside option in date-2 bargaining for a plaintiff’s attorney,
and let U be D’s outside option. Then at date 2, if a lawsuit is settled, the settlement solves:
max
s
(−s− U)1−λ(βs− V )λ ⇒ s∗ = (1− λ)V
β
− λU
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The outside options depend on whether a plaintiff’s attorney wants to withdraw if bargaining fails.
When βqm2 < cp2, PA2 will withdraw, so the outside options are V = U = 0. This implies that
s∗ = 0. That is, without a credible threat, a plaintiff’s attorney cannot extract a positive settlement
in bargaining. When, instead, βqm2 > cp2, a plaintiff’s attorney does not withdraw if bargaining
fails and the case goes to trial. Therefore, V ≡ βqm2 − cp2 and U ≡ −qm2 − cd2. Thus, if they
settle, a plaintiff’s attorney receives V + λ(−V − βU), and D receives U + (1 − λ)(−V
β
− U).
Therefore, they settle if−V
β
−U > 0. Since−V
β
−U = −βqm2−cp2
β
−(−qm2−cd2) = cp2β +cd2 > 0,
they settle. That is, there is no trial at date 2. From D’s perspective, the joint surplus is calculated
by inflating the surplus of PA2 by 1β . From PA2’s perspective, the joint surplus is calculated by
deflating the surplus of D by β. Let ∆2 ≡ ( cp2β + cd2) > 0. Parameter ∆2 is exactly the joint
surplus of settling (from D’s perspective) at date 2 between D and any plaintiff that enters at date
2. Similarly, β∆2 is the joint surplus of settling (from the perspective of the plaintiff’s attorney).
Lemma 4 describes the decisions by date-2 plaintiff attorneys of whether to file lawsuits:
Lemma 4. (Bargaining with Attorney.) Let ∆2 ≡ ( cp2β +cd2) > 0. In the date-2 subgame, plaintiffs
file lawsuits if and only if βqm2 > max{cp2, cp2 + kp2 − λβ∆2}.
There are essentially two necessary conditions for entry. One is that the plaintiff’s attorney
have a credible threat of trial, i.e., βqm2 > cp2 (the credible-trial condition). Otherwise, the conse-
quence of rejecting a settlement offer is not a trial, but rather a voluntary withdrawal of the lawsuit.
The other is that the bargaining settlement covers the pre-trial cost for the plaintiff. With t-i-o-l-i
offers, the second condition implies the first, so only one condition describes the entry decision.
However, when the plaintiff has enough bargaining power, the credible-trial condition becomes the
binding condition for entry; thus, the two terms on the RHS of the entry condition in Lemma 4.
Proposition 9. (Bargaining with Attorney.) Let ∆2 ≡ ( cp2β + cd2) > 0. Then, in equilibrium there
is a trial at date 1 if and only if the following conditions on the date-2 litigation hold:
1. βpim2 ≤ max{cp2, cp2 + kp2 − λβ∆2} < βpim2
2. (1− pi)(pim2 + cd2 + kd2 − (1− λ)∆2)N2 > cp1β + cd1.
Increasing the bargaining power λ of the plaintiff’s attorney expands the circumstances under
which a defendant takes the initial case to trial
Condition 1 again says that a defendant-win at a date-1 trial is necessary to deter entry. Condi-
tion 2 is still the trade-off between settling and going to a trial at date 1. The RHS of Condition 1
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is the cost of going to trial for D and PA1 from their joint perspectives. The LHS of Condition 2 is
the defendant’s date-2 gain from deterring date-2 lawsuits; PA1 does not care about what happens
in the future. In Condition 2, if λ = 0, we are back to t-i-o-l-i offers. A defendant gains more from
deterring date-2 lawsuits when plaintiffs have more bargaining power because she must pay more
to settle if they enter. This makes Condition 2 easier to satisfy, i.e., greater plaintiff bargaining
power increases the circumstances under which a defendant takes the initial case to trial.
5 Conclusion
Sequential litigation can arise when a single defendant injures multiple potential plaintiffs, and the
plaintiffs become aware of the damage, or become capable of filing lawsuits, at different points in
time. In this paper we identify several distinct features of sequential litigation that can render it
worthwhile for a plaintiff and defendant to choose to incur the substantial expenses of a trial, rather
than negotiate a settlement. We first observe that an initial trial outcome—whether the defendant
wins or loses—conveys extensive information to future potential plaintiffs about their prospects
at a trial. Trial outcomes convey more information than do settlements because plaintiffs learn
whether a strategy works, whether a defendant has a particular vulnerability, and positive or neg-
ative precedents may be established. We show that, as a result, the initial lawsuit can go to trial
when an initial defendant-win would cause future potential plaintiffs to update sufficiently nega-
tively about their prospects that they are deterred from filing lawsuits, whereas a settlement would
not. In addition, for a trial to occur, the savings from deterring future lawsuits must exceed the
combined initial trial costs of the plaintiff and defendant. Thus, sequential litigation is likely to
lead to trial when many future cases hinge sensitively on the outcome of the initial trial.
We show that the possibility of meritless lawsuits further raises the attraction of trials. When a
defendant-win deters plaintiffs with serious cases, it also deters plaintiffs with meritless ones. Even
when a defendant-win does not deter serious plaintiffs, when there are enough possible meritless
cases, defendants will sometimes take future plaintiffs to trial, to weed out meritless cases. Ironi-
cally, in this situation, more plaintiffs with meritless cases are deterred following a defendant-loss
than following a defendant-win, precisely because the amount required to settle a serious case is
higher, making a defendant more eager to go to trial to avoid paying out to meritless cases. We also
show that trials are more likely if the initial plaintiff’s attorney may also represent future clients.
This is both because the initial trial outcome can convey valuable information to the plaintiff’s
attorney about whether it is worthwhile to pursue future cases; and because the plaintiff’s attor-
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ney’s ability to attract future clients (at the expense of other attorneys, but not the defendant) may
hinge sensitively on how much he can extract from the defendant for his initial client, giving the
plaintiff’s attorney a preference for a trial over a settlement.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If qm2 ≤ cp2, then D’s date-2 settlement offer is 0. This offer will be accepted
because a date-2 plaintiff does not have a credible threat to go to trial. D has no incentive to make
an unacceptable offer becauseD expects a negative payoff of−qm2−cd2 from a date-2 trial. Thus,
when a date-2 plaintiff contemplates filing a suit, regardless of whether he accepts the zero offer
or withdraws, his expected payoff from filing a lawsuit is negative due to the pre-trial cost kp2.
Therefore, no date-2 plaintiff files if qm2 ≤ cp2.
If qm2 > cp2, then D’s settlement offer at date 2 is qm2 − cp2 > 0. This offer leaves a date-2
plaintiff indifferent between accepting and not. In equilibrium, plaintiffs accept this offer because
otherwise D can make the offer  more attractive to break the indifference. Therefore, a date-2
plaintiff’s expected payoff from filing a lawsuit is qm2− cp2−kp2. Since the payoff from not filing
is 0, a plaintiff files if and only if qm2 − cp2 − kp2 > 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 2. If pim2 < cp2 +kp2, no plaintiffs file. If pim2 ≥ cp2 +kp2, then settling with
a date-2 plaintiff is better for D than going to trial. Settling gives D a payoff of −pim2 + cp2− kd2
in each case, but going to trial gives D a payoff of −pim2 − cd2 in each case. Thus, settling yields
a gain of cp2 + cd2. So no trial happens in equilibrium. We break the analysis down according to
the impact of the date-1 outcome on plaintiff entry at date 2. Let US1 denote D’s date-1 payoff if
D settles at date 1 with the lowest acceptable offer. Let UT1 denote D’s date-1 payoff if D goes to
trial (by making an unacceptable offer). The parameter cases here are the same as in Lemma 1.
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Case 1. Here, regardless of the date-1 outcome, no plaintiff files at date 2. Then the settlement
offer at date 1 only affects D’s date-1 payoff. If D settles, his payoff (not considering the pre-trial
cost kd1) is −pim1 + cp1 because the lowest offer P1 would accept is pim1 − cp1. If D goes to trial,
his payoff (not considering the pre-trial cost of kd1) is−pim1− cd1. Therefore, by settling, D gains
cp1 + cd1. This is the saving in joint surplus (to D and P1) from avoiding a date-1 trial, which is
completely extracted by D because he can make t-i-o-l-i offers.
Case 2. In this parameter region, a plaintiff-win at date 1 causes all date-2 plaintiffs to file even
though they would not after a date-1 settlement. Following a date-1 settlement, the date-2 payoff is
0. Following a date-1 trial, the date-2 expected payoff is pi(−pim2 + cp2 − kd2)N2 < 0 because D
would make a settlement offer of pim2− cp2 > kp2 to each date-2 plaintiff that enters after a date-1
plaintiff-win. Hence, D’s date-2 payoff is higher with a date-1 settlement than a date-1 trial. In
addition, a date-1 settlement brings a gain of cd1 + cp1 to D at date 1 over a date-1 trial. Therefore,
D strictly prefers to settle at date 1 by offering pim1 − cp1 to P1.
Case 3. In this parameter region, a date-1 defendant-win induces all date-2 plaintiffs not to file,
whereas they would file following any other outcome. Following a date-1 settlement, the date-2
payoff is US2 = (−pim2 + cp2−kd2)N2 because D would offer pim2− cp2 to settle each date-2 law-
suit. Following a date-1 trial, the date-2 expected payoff is UT2 = pi(−pim2 + cp2−kd2)N2 because
D would offer pim2 − cp2 to settle each date-2 lawsuit following a plaintiff-win. The difference in
payoffs for D between a date-1 trial and settlement is
UT − US = (1− pi)(pim2 − cp2 + kd2)N2 − (cp1 + cd1).
Case 4. In this parameter region, all date-2 plaintiffs file suits regardless of the date-1 outcome.
Following a date-1 settlement, the date-2 payoff is (−pim2+cp2−kd2)N2. Following a date-1 trial,
the date-2 expected payoff for D is pi(−pim2 + cp2 − kd2)N2 + (1− pi)(−pim2 + cp2 − kd2)N2 =
(−pim2 + cp2 − kd2)N2. Thus, the date-2 payoffs are the same under a date-1 settlement and a
date-1 trial. Comparing reveals that a date-1 settlement brings a gain to D of cp1 + cd1.
Cases 1 - 4 exhaust all possibilities given that pim1 > cp1 + kp1. 2
Proof of Proposition 5. Let V T2 denote the expected date-2 payoff of PA1 when there is a trial
at date 1. Let V S2 denote the corresponding payoff when there is a settlement at date 1. Then s1
must increase by V
T
2 −V S2
β
at date 1 to compensate an attorney with future clients compared to one
without. In parameter cases 1 and 4, V T2 −V S2 = 0, since the date-1 outcome does not affect date-2
entry decision of plaintiffs, so there is no trial at date 1.
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Case 2. In this parameter region, a trial encourages entry with probability pi.
V T2 − V S2
β
= pi(pim2 − cp2 + kp2
β
)αN2.
Therefore,
UT − US = (UT1 + UT2 )− (US1 + US2 )
= pi(−pim2 + cp2
β
− kd2)N2 − (cp1
β
+ cd1) + pi(pim2 − cp2 + kp2
β
)αN2
≤ −pi(kp2
β
+ kd2)N2 − (cp1
β
+ cd1) < 0.
The inequality follows because α ≤ 1. Therefore, the date-1 case is settled.
Case 3. In this parameter region, a trial deters entry with probability 1− pi.
V T2 − V S2
β
= (1− pi)(cp2 + kp2
β
− pim2)αN2.
Therefore, there is a trial at date 1 if and only if,
−(1− pi)(−pim2 + cp2
β
− kd2)N2 − (cp1
β
+ cd1) + (1− pi)(cp2 + kp2
β
− pim2)αN2 > 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 6. Since there is no correlation between date-1 and date-2 trial outcomes,
date-2 plaintiffs believe the probability of winning to be pi. When βpim2 ≤ cp2 + kp2, no plaintiff
files a suit at date 2, so D settles at date 1. If, instead, βpim2 > cp2 + kp2, then all date-2 plaintiffs
enter. It follows that D’s date-2 payoff does not depend on date-1 outcomes, i.e., US2 = U
T
2 .
Case A. w > pim1 − cp1β + pi(1− α)(pim2 − cp2+kp2β )N2.
The offer s∗1 = pim1− cp1β +pi(1−α)(pim2− cp2+kp2β )N2 makes PA1 exactly indifferent between
accepting and rejecting the offer because a trial brings extra (1−α) share of the date-2 market with
probability pi. Any settlement offer above this level would be accepted. Any lesser offer would be
rejected because PA1 would strictly prefer to go to trial, instead. Therefore, if D settles, he would
offer s∗1, which would yield D a settlement payoff of:
US = −pim1 + cp1
β
− pi(1− α)(pim2 − cp2 + kp2
β
)N2 + U
S
2 .
If D instead goes to trial, her payoff is:
UT = −pim1 − cd1 + UT2 .
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The difference is:
UT − US = pi(1− α)(pim2 − cp2 + kp2
β
)N2 − (cd1 + cp1
β
).
Thus, if w satisfies Case A, a date-1 trial occurs if and only if pi(1 − α)(pim2 − cp2+kp2β )N2 >
(cd1 +
cp1
β
).
Case B. pim1 − cp1β + pi(1 − α)(pim2 − cp2+kp2β )N2 ≥ w > pim1 − cp1β − (1 − pi)(1 − α)(pim2 −
cp2+kp2
β
)N2.
The lower bound on w implies that any offer s1 ≥ w is accepted because:
s1 + (pim2 − cp2 + kp2
β
)N2 > pim1 − cp1
β
+ (α + pi(1− α))(pim2 − cp2 + kp2
β
)N2.
The upper bound on w implies that any offer s1 < w is rejected, so the optimal offer by D would
be s∗1 = w. Then,
US = −w + US2 , UT = −pim1 − cd1 + UT2 .
Therefore, a trial happens at date 1 if and only if w > pim1 + cd1.
Case C. pim1 − cp1β − (1− pi)(1− α)(pim2 − cp2+kp2β )N2 ≥ w.
Any offer less than w is rejected. An offer s1 ∈ [w, pim1 − cp1β − (1 − pi)(1 − α)(pim2 −
cp2+kp2
β
)N2) is also rejected because:
s1 + (pim2 − cp2 + kp2
β
)N2 < pim1 − cp1
β
+ (α + pi(1− α))(pim2 − cp2 + kp2
β
)N2.
Also, any offer s1 ≥ pim1 − cp1β − (1 − pi)(1 − α)(pim2 − cp2+kp2β )N2) will be accepted for the
same reason as in Case B. Therefore, the optimal settlement offer is s∗1 = pim1− cp1β − (1−pi)(1−
α)(pim2 − cp2+kp2β )N2. Then,
US = −pim1 + cp1
β
+ (1− pi)(1− α)(pim2 − cp2 + kp2
β
)N2 + U
S
2 > −pim1 − cd1 + UT2 = UT .
This implies US > UT , so there is no trial at date 1 for Case C.
We first establish the sufficiency part of the Proposition 6. When Condition 1 is satisfied, then
either w is large enough that either Case A or Case B holds, in which case Condition 2 then im-
plies that a trial happens at date 1. We now establish the necessity part. There are two ways in
which a trial happens: Case A or Case B. Condition 2 must hold in Case A, which is equiva-
lent to pim1 − cp1β + pi(1 − α)(pim2 − cp2+kp2β )N2 > pim1 + cd1. Since Case A also implies that
31
w > pim1 − cp1β + pi(1 − α)(pim2 − cp2+kp2β )N2, we have w > pim1 + cd1. That is, Condition 1 is
satisfied. If it is Case B, then pim1 − cp1β + pi(1 − α)(pim2 − cp2+kp2β )N2 ≥ w > pim1 + cd1. This
directly contains Condition 1 and implies Condition 2. 2
Proof of Lemma 2. If qm2 < cp2, then D offers s2 = 0 at date 2 because even a serious case is
withdrawn after such an offer and there is no credible threat of a trial.
Now suppose that 0 < qm2− cp2 < kp2. In any subgame equilibrium at date 2 with qm2 > cp2,
D makes one of two possible offers: s2 ∈ {qm2− cp2, 0}, because any other offer is dominated by
one of these offers. When 0 < qm2−cp2 < kp2, even whenD offers qm2−cp2 for sure, no plaintiffs
would want to file given their pre-trial costs, so the subgame equilibrium outcome is no entry.
Now suppose that qm2 > cp2 + kp2. There are two relevant subcases.
Subcase 1. F > cp2+cd2
qm2−cp2 .
There does not exist a subgame equilibrium in which all meritless cases enter. If so, D would
offer s2 = 0 as the settlement offer qm2 − cp2 would be accepted by all meritless cases and will
cost him (qm2−cp2)N2(1+F ), which exceeds (qm2+cd2)N2, the payout at a trial to serious cases
only. Meritless cases would withdraw after such a zero-offer, so their payoff from filing would be
−kp2. Hence, they would not file, a contradiction.
There does not exist a subgame equilibrium in which no meritless cases file suits. If so, D
would settle with the serious cases by offering s2 = qm2 − cp2. But then any meritless case would
want to enter because qm2 − cp2 − kp2 > 0, a contradiction.
Therefore, in a subgame equilibrium, some meritless cases enter and some do not. This implies
that a plaintiff with a meritless case must be indifferent between filing and not. Let y denote the
probability that D offers s2 = qm2 − cp2; the probability of offering s2 = 0 is 1 − y. From the
indifference condition for a plaintiff with a meritless case,
0 = y(qm2 − cp2) + (1− y)0− kp2 ⇒ y = kp2
qm2 − cp2 < 1.
This implies that D is indifferent between offering s2 = qm2 − cp2 to settle any case that enters
and offering s2 = 0, which results in a serious case going to trial. Let the expected number of
meritless cases be xˆN2. Indifference of D implies that
(qm2 − cp2)N2(1 + xˆ) = (qm2 + cd2)N2 ⇒ xˆ = cp2 + cd2
qm2 − cp2 .
Subcase 2. F < cp2+cd2
qm2−cp2 .
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There does not exist a subgame equilibrium where meritless cases are indifferent between en-
tering and not, because then, as in the analysis for Subcase 1, the expected number of meritless
cases filed must be cp2+cd2
qm2−cp2N2, which exceeds the total number of meritless cases, FN2. There
does not exist a subgame equilibrium in which no meritless case enters, for the same reason as in
Subcase 1. Therefore, FN2 meritless cases suits are filed in equilibrium. Since F <
cp2+cd2
qm2−cp2 , the
best response of D is to offer qm2 − cp2 to settle each lawsuit that is filed. 2
Proof of Lemma 3. Note that q = 1
m2
( cp2+cd2
F
+cp2) is equivalent to F =
cp2+cd2
qm2−cp2 , which means that
g is continuous for q > cp2+kp2
m2
. The payoff function is then directly implied by Lemma 2. Next
we show strict convexity of g in the mixed equilibrium range.
g′(q) =
m2N2
(qm2 − c− p)2 (kd2(cp2+cd2)−(qm2−cp2)
2)⇒ g′′(q) = 2m
2
2kd2N2(cp2 + cd2)
(qm2 − cp2)3 > 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 7. Case 1. pim2 < cp2 + kp2. Here, regardless of the date-1 outcome, no
date-2 plaintiffs enter. Then D settles at date 1.
Case 2. pim2 < cp2 + kp2 < pim2. These parameters imply that a plaintiff-win at date 1 attracts
all serious date-2 plaintiffs and some meritless ones who would not otherwise file lawsuits. This
means that there are only costs to a date-1 trial, so D settles at date 1.
Case 3. pim2 < cp2 + kp2 < pim2. In this parameter range, a defendant-win at date 1 causes all
date-2 plaintiffs not to enter, while any other outcome would lead to their entry. By Lemma 3, the
difference between D’s payoffs from a date-1 trial and a date-1 settlement is,
UT − US = pig(pi)− g(pi)− (cp1 + cd1).
Case 4. kp2 + cp2 < pim2. Here, regardless of the date-1 outcome, all serious date-2 plaintiffs
file suits as do some plaintiffs with meritless cases. The number of meritless cases filed depends on
the date-1 outcome. The difference in payoff forD between a date-1 trial and a date-1 settlement is,
UT − US = pig(pi) + (1− pi)g(pi)− g(pi)− (cp1 + cd1). 2
Proof of Proposition 8. If no date-2 suits are filed without commitment, commitment does not mat-
ter. When D plays a mixed strategy at date 2 without commitment, her date-2 payoff is (−qm2 +
cp2 − kd2)N2(1 + cp2+cd2qm2−cp2 ). If she commits to a trial, no meritless cases are filed, and her date-2
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payoff is (−qm2−cd2−kd2)N2. If kd2 = 0, the two payoffs are equal. If kd2 > 0, the payoff under
no commitment is worse because kd2 is applied to more plaintiffs (both serious and meritless ones).
When D plays a pure-strategy (settle) at date 2, her date-2 payoff is (−qm2 + cp2−kd2)N2(1+F ).
If she commits to a trial, no meritless cases are filed, and her date-2 payoff is (−qm2−cd2−kd2)N2.
The difference between these payoffs is (cd2 + cp2)N2 − (qm2 − cp2 + kd2)N2F . Therefore, when
q < 1
m2
( cp2+cd2
F
+ cp2 − kd2), no commitment is better. 2
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